In this paper, the authors examine different investment mechanisms for transportation infrastructure projects involving the private enterprise in developing countries. Roles identified vary from those of a financier to an operator for successful public-private ventures. A case study involving such a joint venture in India, the Mumbai Pune Expressway/National Highway 4 (MPEW/NH4) is presented, and fiscal implications of the program, both from the perspective of the public and the private enterprise are examined. The study concludes that if properly planned, joint ventures can be mutually beneficial. A joint public-private program may enable the public sector to use the resources saved for other public projects. It also provides the private agency an opportunity to invest monies in a profitable enterprise that yields social benefits, (e.g. improving mobility, promoting economic development, etc.). Careful analysis must be conducted before the project is undertaken to assess the financial and economic implications of the project from each __________________________________
Introduction
The multi billion dollar highway infrastructure in the United States (US) was built over the last 200 years and has been financed primarily by public dollars through various forms of user taxes (Garber and Hoel 2001) . Factors such as improved mobility, reduced congestion, and higher safety, along with economic benefits have been used to justify these investments.
Tollways and turnpikes, regardless of tenure, constitute a very small fraction of US highways, and are somewhat of an exception to this rule. Typically, these facilities are financed by longterm bonds, and the revenue generated by the facilities is used to pay for the investment. Very little private funding has been used in the past in the US for roadway infrastructure. Private participation is, however, more common in other modes of transportation, particularly rail, air, and transit prior to 1950s. The concept of Public Private Partnership (PPP) in large infrastructure projects that allows joint ownership of infrastructure has gained some ground during the last decade in the US (Rosenau 2000) .
The object of interest of this paper is investment in transportation in developing countries in Asia, where infrastructure is as much of a priority as in developed countries to meet their mobility needs and to promote economic development. The discussion in the above paragraph relative to US highways is presented only as a reference. Because of a lack of sufficient capital funding, the private sector is being increasingly called upon to participate in such infrastructure programs in developing countries. India for example, has historically used tax revenues as the primary source of funds for road projects. A recent World Bank Report shows that India currently has 3.5 million kilometers (km) of roads, of which approximately 170,000 km are under the national and state highway category (mostly two-lane facilities), representing modest design standards. The National Highway System in India totaling 58,000 km of two-lane facilities, carries 45% of total traffic (World Bank 2004) . In spite of significant public investment on roads by the Government of India, there is a great need today for high quality, high capacity highways to accommodate the ever-increasing traffic in India's metropolitan areas.
Among major transportation programs that the Government of India has undertaken are: a $50 billion highway improvement for the national and state highway system and another multi billion dollar program to connect small villages through a network of roadways. Additionally, $1.5 billion are needed annually to maintain the 170,000 km of national and state highways that serve as the backbone for regional mobility and economic development. But, resources needed to support the construction and maintenance of this massive infrastructure development are not readily available at the Governmental exchequer facing deficits amounting to 9.5 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1 
(World Bank 2004).
India has, in the past, used the traditional approach of road financing, where roads are treated as publicly owned/operated facilities, and are funded from a myriad of sources including general revenue, road user taxes, etc. Private sector financing is being sought increasingly to fund infrastructure programs and tolls are being applied to generate revenues. However, private sector financing "cannot replace the role of the public sector, nor can it reduce the importance of rational, fair and transparent public financing system" (World Bank 2004, p. ii). Thus, joint public-private ventures appear to be the key to the financial success of such projects.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, a brief discussion is presented on the emerging roles of the private sector in transportation infrastructure development in India, with specific examples when possible. Second, a case-study on the recently completed Mumbai-Pune Expressway (MPEW), and a companion facility along the National Highway 4 (NH4) is presented, where the private sector has been called upon to play a major role in the long term operation of these two facilities. The financial implications of this role, both to the public and 1 total market value of all goods and services produced in the country in a given year private entity are examined and general conclusions drawn about the future roles of the private sector in developing countries in Asia.
Role of the private sector
PPP is a technique to attract private capital in a public project that would otherwise be beyond the reach of the public entity. It has been used both in developing and developed countries as a means of delivering, operating and maintaining infrastructure projects, such as bridges, highways, urban rail systems, and power plants. The aforementioned projects are examples of successful PPP projects that have three common ingredients: identification of the major project participants, a commitment by the participants to address the key issues, and development of strategies to share future risks (Ashley et al. 1998 ). The first step of a PPP project is to identify key participants such as the eventual owner, developer, financial investor, and the community users. The second step is to develop a common forum of understanding of the diversity of interests among the project participants, thereby formalizing policy issues. The third step is to formulate a robust approach to share risks that may be encountered during the life of the project.
The literature review conducted as a part of this research indicates a number of ways in which the private sector can be involved in transportation infrastructure investment. Discussions with experts in India indicate that the private sector has been involved in two ways in India: as a lender and as a promoter.
The Private Sector as a Lender
In this role, the private entity acts as a financier and is interested in the project primarily from an investment point of view, where profit margins are expected to be high. Depending on the size of the project, the private entity can be a single investor; or a group of investors; a corporation; a banking institution or a group of corporations/institutions. The private entity, depending on the agreement, may or may not participate in the policy-making activities of the Principal/Organization seeking the loan.
An example of this role in India can be found in the urban rail system currently being built in Delhi Metropolitan Area (the nation's capital) by the Delhi Metropolitan Rail Corporation (DMRC). This is a multi-phase urban rail transit project designed to meet projected traffic demand for the year 2021, consisting of 67 stations and 244 km of rail network to be built in four phases. Phase 1 of the project has recently been completed and includes a combination of underground, elevated and at-grade sections comprising 65 km and 59 stations (DMRC 2007) . A group of Japanese Banks, led by Japan Bank for International Corporation (JBIC), is a major financier for the project, and is expected to cover more than 60 percent of the project cost (Sreedharan 2004 ). The concession agreement defines the roles and responsibilities of the participating agencies, particularly the Principal, the Promoter, and the support agencies. BOOT projects are essentially turnkey contracts financed by the contractor, with extended operation and maintenance periods. If the project is planned properly, the principal or the Government agency has nothing to lose, as it essentially inherits a "fully operational facility," free and clear, at the end of the concession period. It is, however, important for the Governmental agency to ensure that the facility continues to generate revenue at the end of the concession period without a major infusion of resources. The private entity on the other hand, can take advantage of an investment opportunity, and generate a healthy return over the concession period.
The Private Sector as a Promoter
Variations of the BOOT concept have been used in different countries in many different forms:
• FBOOT finance-build-own-operate-transfer;
• BOO build-own-operate; • BOT build-operate-transfer; • BOL build-operate-lease; The LOT program is another derivative of the BOOT concept, where the private entity leases an existing facility for a specified amount; operates the system for the concession period;
and transfers the operational rights of the facility to the Principal at the end of the prescribed period. Technically, the public entity "sells" the operational rights of the facility to the private agency for a negotiated price. In exchange, the private agency "earns" the right to collect and retain the toll charges as its earnings from the investment. The facility must be returned to the government in fully operational condition at the end of the prescribed term. The MPEW project discussed in the next section is an example of the LOT concept.
Methodology
The methodology used in this study is presented in two sections: (1) deriving the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), and (2) procedure used for estimating costs and benefits.
IRR
IRR provides an estimate of the return or yield of the investment, given a set of expenditure and revenue data along with their expected dates over the life of the project. It is the annualized compounded return rate derived from an investment comprising payments and earnings at different points/periods in time during the tenure of the project. IRR is defined as the interest rate at which the Net Present Worth (or Net Annual Worth or Net Future Worth) of the investment is equal to zero. The generic form of the model is:
where, 
Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) vs. Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR)
The IRR technique has been used in the literature to evaluate project viability. Examples include decision economic model for parking facility planning in urban locations (Merino 1989 The definitions of EIRR and FIRR are as follows:
EIRR: The rate of return that would be achieved on all project resource costs, where all benefits and costs are measured in economic prices. For a project to be acceptable, the EIRR should be greater than the economic opportunity cost of capital (ADB 2000).
FIRR:
The rate of return that would be achieved on all project costs, where all costs are measured in financial prices and when benefits represent the financial revenues that would accrue to the main project participant. It should be compared with the Opportunity cost of capital, or the weighted average cost of capital, to assess the financial sustainability of a project (ADB 2000).
In this paper, two broad categories of analysis are reported, (1) for the private entity, and (2) for the public entity. Following the principles described above, for the private entity, the only benefit considered were the toll receipts for FIRR analysis. For the public entity, benefits include only the toll receipts for FIRR analysis. Additionally, savings in vehicle operating cost (VOC) and savings in travel time (TT) were included in the EIRR analysis. These savings were 
Procedures for Estimating Costs and Benefits
While the data on toll charges, volume, expected growth, etc., were derived directly from 
Case study of MPEW and NH4
Mumbai is the commercial and financial capital of India with a population of more than 15 million. Pune with a population of over five million is a major urban center in the state of Maharashtra, and is growing into a major industrial and commercial center, being the automotive capital of India. Hence, the importance of Mumbai-Pune travel corridor increased tremendously in last decade. The travel demand is currently served by a multimodal system comprising rail, air and highways. The road traffic demand warrants a ten-lane system between the two cities (MSRDC 2007).
Background Information
For a long time, the National Highway 4 (NH4) was the only available roadway During the lease period, the private entity was required to widen NH4 from two lanes to four lanes and to open the facility to traffic in 2007 (Fig. 1) . MPEW and NH4 are to be delivered back to MSRDC and the Government of Maharashtra respectively in 2020 in fully operational condition. MSRDC is expected to resume its role of operating and maintaining MPEW for the remainder of its service life up to the year 2030. Since NH4 is an older facility, it was assumed for the purpose of this case study, that NH4 will not have any further life left after 2019.
Realistically however, to meet the traffic demand, the Government may be required to make a significant investment to keep the facility operational. No decision on the disposition of NH4 beyond 2019 has been made at this point. Table 1 
Results
The base year savings in VOC and TT (for the two candidate alternatives, MPEW and NH4 with respect to the NH4 (old) or the base condition)), computed according to the CRRI procedures are presented in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. In Table 2 , various parameters are computed for the three facilities (MPEW, NH4 and NH4 (old)) for five vehicular categories, and presented in columns 3, 4, 5, and 6. The mode-specific VOC's for each facility computed using Table 1 ), and the length of the facility (see Table 1 ).
Total operation and maintenance cost is presented in column 12 is the summation of operation cost (column 10) and maintenance cost (column 11). In Table 2 , costs and savings are shown for the base year. Similar cost figures (annual) for the entire analysis period were derived using the traffic growth data for each mode presented in Table 1 .
Travel time savings data in minutes for each mode is computed as the difference in travel time between the base case and the proposed facility (Table 3, time saved (column 6) for a facility is the sum-product of traffic volume for each mode and the corresponding value of travel time saved. Fig. 2(a) and 2(b) show the cash flow diagrams reflected in the economic analysis for the MPEW and NH4 projects respectively from the public entity's perspective. Corresponding results are presented in Table 4 . Case (a) of Table 4 shows that the FIRR and EIRR generated for the MPEW project for the public entity are 5.07 percent and 13.95 percent (columns 10 and 11) respectively. Corresponding figures for NH4 are shown in case (b). Since the public entity did not invest any money on NH4 rebuilding, and does not receive any toll from NH4, the FIRR calculation is not applicable (NA). By the same token, the public entity derives the savings in VOC and in TT without any investment, so that corresponding EIRR is very high or infinity.
Public Entity Perspective
A number of other analyses are presented in Table 4 . Case (c) shows the analysis for the hypothetical case of the public entity continuing to operate MPEW without any private investment whatsoever. In that case, the expected FIRR and EIRR for the public entity would have been 7.05 percent and 14.75 percent respectively, both considerably higher than their corresponding values of 5.07 percent and 13.95 percent under current operation. This is expected, as the public entity must be ready to share the project returns with its partners to attract private capital. The differential between the two sets of EIRR's/FIRR's can be looked upon as the "price" paid by the public entity to secure private participation.
Case (d), Table 4 shows that if the current operating plan for MPEW were to be continued over the life of the project, (i.e. if the private entity is allowed to continue the operation of MPEW beyond the year 2019, up to the year 2030), the minimum "asking price" by the public entity will be $524.31 millions in the year 2019 (column 6) for it to earn the same FIRR of 5.07 percent. Stated differently, the private entity must be wiling to pay a minimum of $524.31 million to the public entity to continue to operate MPEW and collect toll beyond the year 2019 up to the year 2030.
Case (e) of Table 4 shows the combined FIRR and EIRR to the public entity from the two plans under current operating plans are 5.07 percent and 16.32 percent respectively. Since the public entity neither invests any money in the NH4 rebuilding project, nor receives any direct benefit, the combined FIRR to the public entity from the two projects is the same as the FIRR from MPEW. However, the combined EIRR is higher because of the additional external benefits 
Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
An additional set of analyses was conducted to test if the procedure/methods used to estimate the project returns from the perspective of public and private entity are sensitive to the changes in key variables. Table 6 shows that an increase in operating cost, reduction in volume, and reduction in toll rates, considered one factor at a time, will result in a reduction in the EIRR and FIRR (where appropriate), both for the public and private entity for the two facilities. Also, Table 6 shows that an increase in toll rate will result in an increase in EIRR and FIRR.
Additionally, a set of scenario analysis, with each scenario comprising changes in all three factors together (operation and maintenance cost, traffic volume and toll rates) is reported in Table 7 . Table 7 shows that resultant changes in the EIRR and FIRR do follow expected trends. For example, the combined effect of an increase in O&M cost, a decrease in traffic volume and a decrease in toll rate (Scenarios 1, 2, and 3) is a decrease in EIRR and FIRR.
Similarly, increases in traffic volume and in toll rates (Scenario-4) result in an increase in FIRR and EIRR., suggesting that the positive effect of toll increase outweighs the adverse effect of higher volume (resulting in higher operation and maintenance cost).
Conclusions
Initial discussions presented in this paper identify various roles that the private sector may play in supporting transportation infrastructure programs in developing countries. This participation can take a number of different forms, and examples of such private involvement are cited in the paper. A case study involving the MPEW and NH4 in India is presented to examine the consequence of joint private-public participation in a major infrastructure project. The authors feel that the trends, rather than the numbers, are more important in drawing meaningful conclusions regarding the outcome of such projects. The sensitivity and the scenario analyses show that the trends observed are reasonable and logical.
The case study indicates that the PPP infrastructure project has been mutually beneficial.
The private entity in this case, derives a healthy return exceeding 20 percent from the combination of the two projects MPEW and NH4, with a larger contribution by the latter project.
The public entity, by transferring the operational rights of the two facilities, loses the opportunity for earning a sustained level of revenue. However even with the income foregone through future toll charges, the public sector earns a 5.07 percent FIRR and 16.32 percent EIRR. Considering that a primary mission of the public sector is to derive social benefits from public investment, a 16.32 percent EIRR appears to be an excellent investment. The $225 million (900 crores of Indian rupees) received from the private entity for the MPEW project, along with the maintenance/operational expenses saved, will allow the public entity to invest public funds in other socially desirable programs. Similarly, the $100 million (400 crores of Indian rupees)
"saved" by the public entity along with associated maintenance and operating expenses in rebuilding and operating NH4 can be used to finance other programs to benefit the taxpayers.
Lastly, the public entity is protected from any risks/uncertainties associated with collection of future tolls during the concession period.
Additional efforts should be undertaken to examine the financial implications of these programs from the perspective of the public sector and the private sector. Future research should incorporate the concept of risk and uncertainty into the economic analysis. The EIRR and FIRRvalues computed in this paper are based upon the assumption of the future returns (toll charges, savings in VOV, and TT) being fully known. In reality, there are uncertainties associated with these returns. Further, over an extended life period, the more distant the future is, the more uncertain the return is likely to be. This feature underscores the importance of incorporating risks and uncertainties into the analysis.
Assuming that the future toll revenues and operating/maintenance expenditures can be predicted with reasonable accuracy, PPP appears to be a very desirable way to support major infrastructure projects in situations where there is not enough capital funding at the public exchequer to support these projects. While this may be true for developing countries in Asia (and elsewhere), the PPP approach is being increasingly looked upon as a viable tool for supporting infrastructure projects in developed countries as well. Such participation can be mutually beneficial in that it can save the public agency capital expenditures and protect it from future risks associated with raising enough revenues. In exchange for these savings in capital cost and opportunity costs, the public sector is required to forgo future benefits. The private agency has the opportunity to derive a healthy return from the investment, if the facility is maintained properly and operated efficiently. The last factor may serve as an incentive to the private agency to keep the facility under proper maintenance to the benefit of the public agency. The public agency should maintain some degree of control over the operation of the facility during the concession period, and should have a strong voice in the governance of the facility, since the facility is for public benefit after all.
A comprehensive set of financial and economic analyses should be conducted by each participating entity independently before the entity decides to participate in the project in a designated role. Risks and uncertainties should be taken into account to the extent possible, and each participant should make its own decision based upon the information available.
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